

Saigon.)

Sect history shows possibility of quiet ^{ck} realignment: Japanese, Vietmin, French, Anti-VC, anti-Diem/VC, pro-GVN... With effect. Why are they now fractionated?

Resistance to VC - alternative "spontaneous" (non-GVN sponsored)

organization (reflecting local roots, leadership, interests, accepted doctrine: spread by dedicated proselytizers, and families, responding to psychological and political needs) (Almost never, GVN-sponsored organization or GVN efforts)

Yet, GVN campaigns to destroy or limit power and growth of such organizations (except Catholics): Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai; labor; Buddhists -- failed to destroy them: as groups repelling Communist domination.

(Viet Minh alienated: Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, HENCE: VC HAVEN'T WON IN COCHINCHINA, AND FRENCH DID! VM did not use adroit political policy.)

(Why were not Ho political methods used in South?)

French did! (Why did they not in North? No indigenous groups?) Did Diem/US ever pay salaries for Hoa Hao or Cao Dai militia?

4. Above all, the human, political, and material costs of continuing our part in the war far outweigh any prospective benefits, and are greater than the foreseeable costs and risks of disengagement.

The opponent's morale, leadership, and performance all evidence his continuing resiliency, determination, and effectiveness, even under extremely adverse conditions (in no small part because of his conviction that he fights for a just and vital cause). Estimates that the opponent's will or capacity (in North or South Vietnam) is critically weakening because of internal strains and military pressures are, in our view, erroneous. Even if a new strategy should produce military successes in Vietnam, substantially reduce U.S. costs, and dampen domestic opposition, Hanoi could not be induced to make any concessions (e.g. cease-fire or mutual withdrawals), so long as they implied recognition of the authority of the Saigon government. Thus, to make the end of U.S. involvement contingent upon such concessions is to perpetuate our presence indefinitely.

Our participation in the war will also be unjustifiably prolonged if we tie total withdrawal to basic changes in the policies and character of the Saigon government. The primary interest of the present Saigon leadership is to perpetuate its status and power, and that interest is served not by seeking an end to hostilities through negotiations but only by continuing the war with U.S. support. This interest is thus directly opposed to ours. For the same reason, the present Saigon government is not likely to seek the long-awaited improvements and "broadening" of its base. The United States should not obstruct favorable political change in Saigon by unconditional support of the present regime. Yet, we believe, the United States should in no event compromise or postpone the goal of total withdrawal by active American involvement in Vietnamese politics. Such interventions in the past have only increased our sense of responsibility for an outcome we cannot control.

Our withdrawal might itself produce the kinds of desirable political changes in Saigon that the U.S. presence seems to have inhibited, including the emergence of a cohesive nationalist consensus; and it might give better focus to our alliance relationships elsewhere in the world by bringing our Vietnam policy into line with the President's declaration in Guam on the limits of our partnerships.

As for global U.S. interests, the original rationale for a large-scale U.S. military effort in Vietnam -- the prevention of proxy victories by the USSR or Communist China -- has long since been discredited. Moreover, we regard the Vietnamese insurgency as having special characteristics that cannot be considered typical of or exerting decisive influence on other revolutionary movements in Asia or elsewhere.

last night the President picked up
a fallen standard, and renamed it
Nixon's War. ~~But~~ On a closer look, the
war he proposes to ^{continue} ~~propose~~ is indistinguishable
~~from~~ disarmingly close to Johnson's War: an
~~open-ended~~ commitment to the pursuit of
unattainable ends, open-ended in time, cost,
and the use of American firepower against Vietnamese.
TP The cost in US troops, ^{deployed} ~~and~~ casualties may, in any
one year, be less than the limits of recent years,
at least so long as ~~there~~ a "hull" persists. Yet why
should Hawaii continue to refrain from its own
program of "maximum pressure"? Is the fear of
the President's ~~own~~ policy? On the contrary, every
aspect of that policy — ~~recesses~~ ~~public~~ ~~unintended~~
the ~~implicit~~, indefinite continuation of ^{US} air and
implicit promises of
logistical support to ^{a narrow-based,} an anti-Communist regime,
the ^{unconditional political} ~~open~~ support for that regime, the ^{military}
apparently slow and ~~stagnant~~ indefinite program of